巴菲特2019年致股东信中英文全文

2019版巴菲特股东信英文版原文，以下为中英对照版，Google辅助翻译，已审校完毕。如有错漏，欢迎留言。

54年全集详见 这里

在本年度股东信中，巴菲特依次提到了如下信息：

1、抱怨了新GAAP规则不科学，导致财务报表中的利润数字可能发生“狂野的波动”，但实际上所有业务都在健康、稳健增长；2、不再聚焦账面价值，并阐述了3点原因；3、2018年初的管理层变动，取得很好的效果；4、介绍了伯克希尔的五个小树林体系：①控股公司；②持有股权的投资（5-10%）；③与其他公司分享控制权的公司；④现金等价物；⑤保险公司。5、未来计划回购伯克希尔股份，如果股价低于内在价值；6、非保险业务：2018年初减税法案，提升了内在价值；7、伯克希尔四个资金来源：①信贷（集中在重资产公司，不过度举债）；②股权，收益投资获取复利，不分红；③保险公司浮存金（免息，甚至有收益）；④递延所得税；

致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：

Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), $2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a $20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.

2018年伯克希尔利润为40亿美元（GAAP下）。包括24.8亿美元的运营利润、30亿美元的非现金形式的无形资产减记（主要来自卡夫亨氏）、28亿美元的资本利得（来自出售可投资证券）、206亿美元的亏损（来自投资组合的未实现资本损失）。

A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as “wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.”

GAAP新规要求将未实现的投资组合资本损益计入利润统计中。 正如我在2017年年度报告中强调的那样，我和伯克希尔副董事长芒格都表示反对。 相反，我们俩都一直认为，在伯克希尔，这种按市价计价的变化会令伯克希尔的利润发生狂野且反复无常的波动。

The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of $1.1 billion and $25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of $12 billion and $18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of $17.6 billion by 41%.

2018年的季报证明了以这一点。第一和第四季度，我们分别录得11亿和254亿美元损失（GAAP下）。 而第二和第三季度，我们又录得120亿美元和185亿美元利润。 与此形成鲜明对比的是，伯克希尔旗下各家公司在去年所有季度都拥有持续且令人满意的营业利润，超过2016年利润高峰176亿美元的幅度高达41%。

Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That’s because our huge equity portfolio – valued at nearly $173 billion at the end of 2018 – will often experience one-day price fluctuations of $2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a “profit” or “loss” of more than $4 billion.

我们季度GAAP收益的大幅波动将不可避免地继续下去。 那是因为我们的巨额股权投资组合 - 在2018年底价值接近1730亿美元 - 通常会出现一天超过20亿美元的波动。而这些按照新的GAAP规则必须立即计入利润。 的确，在四季度，股价高位震荡的时期，我们经历了“盈利”或“亏损”超过40亿美元的几天。

Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.

我们的建议？ 专注于营业利润，不要关注收益或损失。 但这并不意味这我们将削弱投资对伯克希尔投资的重要性。我和查理始终希望投资能为我们带来可观的收益，尽管它拥有高度不确定性。

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Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. It’s now time to abandon that practice.

我们的老读者会发现今年的股东信发生了变化。 过去三十年，我们总是会在开头提到伯克希尔每股账面价值的变化。现在是时候放弃这种做法了。

The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire’s book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.

事实上每股账面价值已经失去了相关性，有三大原因导致了这一现象。首先，伯克希尔逐渐从资产集中在可销售股票的公司，转变为主要价值在于经营业务的公司。其次，虽然我们持有的股权按市场价格计算，但会计规则要求我们用账面价值来记录我们旗下公司的价值，而这远低于当前市价。第三，未来伯克希尔很可能将回购股票，交易价格将高于账面价值、但低于我们估计的内生价值。回购将令每股内生价值上升、每股账面价值下降，将导致账面价值越来越与经济现实脱节。

In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire’s market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire’s stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.

在未来的财务业绩表中，我们期望关注伯克希尔的市场价格。 市场可以非常反复无常：只要看看第2页列出的54年历史。然而，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔的股价才是反应我们经营业绩的最佳指标。

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Before moving on, I want to give you some good news – really good news – that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.

在继续之前，我想给你一些好消息 - 真正的好消息 - 这些都没有反映在我们的财报中。2018年初管理层发生变动，Ajit Jain负责保险业务，Greg Abel负责其他所有业务。事实证明这个变化早就应该推进了。伯克希尔现在的管理得比我独自管理时要好得多。 阿吉特和格雷格拥有难得的天赋，同时也拥有伯克希尔的基因和价值观。

Now let’s take a look at what you own.

现在让我们来看看你拥有的东西。

专注于森林 - 忘记树木

Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic “trees,” so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.

评估伯克希尔的投资者有时会对我们众多不同业务的细节——我们的“每一棵树”都仔细研究。考虑到我们拥有大量的投资标的，就如同在森林中有种类繁多的树种一样，这种分析的结果可能会让人头脑麻木。我们的一些树木会生病，但是病期不会超过十年。与此同时，还有大量其他树木在茁壮成长。

Fortunately, it’s not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic business value. That’s because our forest contains five “groves” of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.

幸运的是，投资者没有必要单独评估每棵树，并以此来估算伯克希尔内在的商业价值。那是因为我们的森林包含五个重要的“小树林”，每个小树林都可以以合理的准确度进行评估。其中四个是易于理解的差异化企业和金融资产集群。第五个——我们庞大而多样化的保险业务——以不太明显的方式为伯克希尔提供了巨大的价值。

Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.

在我们更仔细地研究前四个树林之前，让我提醒一下您在资本配置中的首要目标：购买具有良好和持久发展特征公司的股票——全仓或者分散买都可以。当然，我们在购买这些股票的时候，还要以合理的价格来购买。

Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage.

有时我们可以买下符合条件公司的控制权，但是我们更通常的做法是，在公司公开交易的股份中，我们买下5%到10%的股份。我们这种双管齐下的投资策略在美国很少见，但这种策略也给我们带来了重要优势。

In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been clear: Many stocks have offered far more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses in their entirety. That disparity led us to buy about $43 billion of marketable equities last year, while selling only $19 billion. Charlie and I believe the companies in which we invested offered excellent value, far exceeding that available in takeover transactions.

近年来，我们遵循的这一明智之路已经获得了很明确的收益：许多我们分散购买的股票为我们提供的利益比我们买下整个公司获得的利益要大得多。这种差异化的交易策略，让我们在去年买入了约430亿美元公开发售的股票，但是我们仅仅抛了190亿美元的股票。我们相信，我们投资的公司为我们提供了极好的价值，远远超过了收购这些公司带来的价值。

Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most valuable grove in Berkshire’s forest remains the many dozens of non-insurance businesses that Berkshire controls (usually with 100% ownership and never with less than 80%). Those subsidiaries earned $16.8 billion last year. When we say “earned,” moreover, we are describing what remains after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial compensation (whether cash or stock-based), restructuring expenses, depreciation, amortization and home-office overhead.

除了在股票投资上或以之外，伯克希尔森林体系中最有价值的一个小树林依然是数十个伯克希尔控股的非保险公司（我们在这些公司的股份通常是100%，没有低于80%的）。这些子公司在去年为我们贡献了168亿美元的净利润（在扣除各种税费之后）。

That brand of earnings is a far cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs. Too often, their presentations feature “adjusted EBITDA,” a measure that redefines “earnings” to exclude a variety of all-too-real costs.

这一定义与华尔街银行家和一些CEO们常常兜售的概念相去甚远。他们通常会使用“调整后的EBITDA”，这种方法把一些应当计入的成本排除在外。

For example, managements sometimes assert that their company’s stock-based compensation shouldn’t be counted as an expense. (What else could it be – a gift from shareholders?) And restructuring expenses? Well, maybelast year’s exact rearrangement won’t recur. But restructurings of one sort or another are common in business – Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our shareholders have always borne the costs of doing so.

例如，管理层有时会断言他们的股票激励不应该算作费用。 （还能算做什么 -来自股东的 礼物 ？）重组费用？ 也许去年的重组不会再发生。 但是，这各种重组非常常见 - 伯克希尔已经走了几十次这条路，我们的股东一直承担着这样做的代价。

Abraham Lincoln once posed the question: “If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does it have?” and then answered his own query: “Four, because calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.” Abe would have felt lonely on Wall Street.

亚伯拉罕·林肯（Abraham Lincoln）曾提出过这样一个问题：“如果你把狗的尾巴称为腿，它有多少条腿？”然后回答了他自己的疑问：“四条，因为把尾巴称为一条腿并不能使他真正成为一条腿。”

Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition-related amortization expenses of $1.4 billion (detailed on page K-84) are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization “costs” to GAAP earnings when we are evaluating both private businesses and marketable stocks.

我们认为，伯克希尔与收购相关的14亿美元的摊销费用并不是真正的经济成本。当我们评估私营企业和公开发售股票时，我们将这部分摊销“成本”加回到GAAP下的收益中。

In contrast, Berkshire’s $8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost. In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply remain competitive in our many operations. Beyond those “maintenance” capital expenditures, we spend large sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a record $14.5 billion last year in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America.

伯克希尔的84亿美元折旧费低估了我们的真实经济成本。事实上，我们需要每年花费超过这笔金额，以便在我们的许多业务中保持竞争力。除此之外“维护”资本支出，我们花费大量资金追求增长。总体而言，伯克希尔去年在工厂，设备和其他固定资产方面的投资达到创纪录的145亿美元，其中89%用于美国。

Berkshire’s runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity investments were worth nearly $173 billion at yearend, an amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold at its yearend valuation, federal income tax of about $14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain. In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long time. Eventually, however, gains generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale.

按价值计算，排在第二名的小树林是我们的股权投资，我们通常投在那些大公司5%至10%的股权。我们的股权投资在年底时价值接近1730亿美元，远高于其成本。如果我们将这些投资按照年底的估值售，那么将缴纳约147亿美元的联邦所得税。不过，我们很有可能将长时间持有其中大部分的股票。

Our investees paid us dividends of $3.8 billion last year, a sum that will increase in 2019. Far more important than the dividends, though, are the huge earnings that are annually retained by these companies. Consider, as anindicator, these figures that cover only our five largest holdings.

去年，我们还获得了这些投资标的38亿美元的分红，这笔款项将在2019年增加。我们在此公布我们从持有最多价值股票的五家公司获得的分红情况：

（1）根据目前的年率。

（2）基于2018年的收益减去已支付的普通和优先股息。

GAAP – which dictates the earnings we report – does not allow us to include the retained earnings of investees in our financial accounts. But those earnings are of enormous value to us: Over the years, earnings retained by our investees (viewed as a group) have eventually delivered capital gains to Berkshire that totaled more than one dollar for each dollar these companies reinvested for us.

GAAP - 它决定了我们报告的收益 - 不允许我们包括的留存收益投资对象在我们的财务账户中。 但这些收益对我们来说具有巨大价值：多年来，收益保持不变。我们的被投资者（被视为一个集团）最终为伯克希尔提供了不止一笔资金。这些公司为我们再投资的每一美元的美元。

All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics, and most use a portion of their retained earnings to repurchase their shares. We very much like that: If Charlie and I think an investee’s stock is underpriced, we rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase Berkshire’s ownership percentage.

我们投资的主要股票都有出色的经济收益，而且大部分公司都使用部分留存收益来回购股票。我们非常喜欢这样：如果我们认为被投资公司的股票价格被低估，那么当管理层将其部分收益用于增加伯克希尔的所有权比例时，我们感到高兴。

Here’s one example drawn from the table above: Berkshire’s holdings of American Express have remained unchanged over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchases made by the company. Last year, Berkshire’s portion of the $6.9 billion earned by American Express was $1.2 billion, about 96% of the $1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company. When earnings increase and shares outstanding decrease, owners – over time – usually do well.

以上是从上表中得出的一个例子：伯克希尔持有的美国运通股份过去八年中没有变化。 同时，由于公司回购，我们的所有权从12.6％增加到17.9％。 去年，伯克希尔公司在美国运通公司获得12亿美元收益，约占我们为运通股权支付的13亿美元的96％。 当利润增加、在外流通股减少，这通常是件好事。

A third category of Berkshire’s business ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share control with other parties. Our portion of the after-tax operating earnings of these businesses – 26.7% of Kraft Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas, and 38.6% of Pilot Flying J – totaled about $1.3 billion in 2018.

第三类则是伯克希尔公司与其他方共享控制权的公司。我们在这些业务中的部分税后利润——包括卡夫亨氏的26.7%，Berkadia和德国电力传输的50%，以及Pilot Flying J的38.6%——在2018年总计约13亿美元。

In our fourth grove, Berkshire held $112 billion at yearend in U.S. Treasury bills and other cash equivalents, and another $20 billion in miscellaneous fixed-income instruments. We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having pledged to always hold at least $20 billion in cash equivalents to guard against external calamities. We have also promised to avoid any activities that could threaten our maintaining that buffer.

在我们森林体系的第四部分，伯克希尔在年底持有1120亿美元的美国国库券和其他现金等价物，以及另外200亿美元的各类固定收益工具。我们认为这部分资金平时是不会轻易动的，我们承诺始终持有至少200亿美元的现金等价物以防范各类意外。

Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash.

有时，随着投资者逃离股市，我们的股票将会下挫。但我永远不会冒现金短缺的风险。

In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects.

在未来几年，我们希望将大部分过剩流动资金转移到伯克希尔将永久拥有的业务中。然而，眼前可能并不是好的时机：那些拥有良好长期前景的企业股票价格现在是天价。

That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 – I’m the young one – that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie’s to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.)

这意味着，在2019年，我们将扩大公开市场交易股票投资的规模，但同时也会考虑对大公司的收购。

My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.

我对更多投资股票的预期不是市场需求。我们并不知道下周或明年的股票表现会如何。我们也从未进行过这种预测。相反，我们的想法是专注于计算有吸引力的公司股票价格是否比市场价格更高。

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I believe Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves and then subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually payable on the sale of marketable securities.

我相信伯克希尔的内在价值可以通过加总我们上述4个资产端的森林、减去税费得出。

You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain of our wholly-owned businesses. Forget that thought: It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.

您可能会问，如果我们出售全资子公司时发生巨额税费支出，是不是应该进行补贴。 忘记这个想法：我们卖掉任何一个很棒的公司都是愚蠢的，即使不需要缴纳税款。 真正优秀的企业非常难找。 出售任何你有幸拥有的东西毫无意义。

The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire’s non-insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our ownership of the first four groves is financed by funds generated from Berkshire’s fifth grove – a collection of exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds “float,” a source of financing that we expect to be cost-free – or maybe even better than that – over time. We will explain the characteristics of float later in this letter.

我们在计算伯克希尔非保险业务的成本时，已将所有债务的利息成本扣除。 除此之外，我们对前四个树林的大部分所有权的资金，都来自伯克希尔的第五个小树林 - 一系列优秀的保险公司。 我们将这些资金称为“浮存金”，这是一种成本几乎为零、甚至拥有收益的资金来源。

Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire’s value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.

最后，重要的一点：伯克希尔的价值最大化是由这五个小树林结合成一个有机整体。 这种安排使我们能够无缝地分配大量资金资本，消除企业风险，避免孤立，以极低的成本获取资金购买资产。

At Berkshire, the whole is greater – considerably greater – than the sum of the parts.

在伯克希尔，整体比部分的总和更大 - 相当大。

回购和报告

Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.

早些时候我提到伯克希尔将不时回购自己的股票。 假设我们回购的价格低于伯克希尔的内在价值 - 这当然是我们的意图 - 回购将使离开公司和留下来的股东都获得收益。

True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That’s because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire’s stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market.

诚然，回购的好处对于那些离开的股东来说非常轻微。 那是因为我们将谨慎回购，以尽量减少对伯克希尔股票价格的影响。 然而，这总归会吸引更多的买入者。

For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner’s interest at, say, 90 on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is valuedestructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs.

对于继续持有的股东而言，优点显而易见：如果市场价格发生扭曲，1美元价值只值90分，这时候如果公司回购，每股内在价值将会提升，继续持有的股东将会从中受益。 显然回购应该是对价格敏感的：在过高股价盲目买入是对股票价值的破坏，这一点被很多乐观的CEO们忽视了。

When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it’s vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed.

重要的是，当一家公司表示它打算进行回购时，所有股东都应有权知晓其所需信息，以便对价值进行明智的估算。 提供这些信息是查理和我尝试的在这份报告中所做的。 我们不希望股东卖出股票，仅仅以为他被误导或并不充分知情。

Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.

然而，一些卖家可能不同意我们的价值计算，而其他卖家可能已经找到了他们认为比伯克希尔股票更有吸引力的投资。 当然，的确有许多股票将比伯克希尔能带来更大的收益。

In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it’s time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.

此外，某些股东认为是时候不需要再积累资本，而是可以成为一个纯消费者。 查理和我目前没有兴趣加入这个队伍。 当我们年老的时候可能需要非常大的开支。

**********

For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results.

54年来，我们在伯克希尔的管理决策都是从继续持有股份的角度、而不是从即将离场的角度出发。 因此，查理和我 从未专注于当前季度的财报。

Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire’s overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis.

事实上，伯克希尔可能是财富500强中唯一一家没有编制月度盈利报告或资产负债表的公司。 当然，我经常查看大多数子公司的月度财务报告。 但查理和我仅按季度了解伯克希尔的整体收益和财务状况。

Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly “number” to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.

此外，伯克希尔没有公司范围的预算（尽管我们的许多子公司都发现预算很有用）。 这意味着母公司 从未有过季度“数字”。

Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an “innocent” fudge in order to not disappoint “the Street” – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a “cookie-jar” reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers “just this once” may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.

多年来，查理和我见过各种不良的公司行为，包括会计和运营，来源于管理层希望迎合华尔街的期望。 很多CEO最初会想玩弄数字游戏“就这一次”，但最终并非如此。另外如果老板可以做一些小的欺骗行为，那员工仿效就变得天经地义了。

At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.

在伯克希尔，我们的观众既不是分析师也不是评论员：查理和我一直为我们的股东工作。呈现给我们的财务数字也将是最终呈现给你们的。

非保险业务 - 从棒棒糖到机车

Let’s now look further at Berkshire’s most valuable grove – our collection of non-insurance businesses –keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily hand our competitors information that might be useful to them. Additional details about individual operations can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-51.

让我们现在进一步了解伯克希尔最有价值的小树林 - 我们的非保险业务 -请记住，我们不希望不必要地向竞争对手提供可能对他们有用的信息。

Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre-tax income in 2018 of $20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017. Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount of that gain.

作为一个整体，这些业务2018年的税前收入为208亿美元，比上年增长24％。我们在2018年进行的收购只贡献了微不足道的收益。

I will stick with pre-tax figures in this discussion. But our after-tax gain in 2018 from these businesses was far greater – 47% – thanks in large part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective at the beginning of that year. Let’s look at why the impact was so dramatic.

在这次讨论中，我会坚持税前数字。 但是，这些业务在2018年的税后利润的增长大得多 - 47％ -在很大程度上因为年初生效的减税措施。 让我们来看看为什么影响如此戏剧性。

Begin with an economic reality: Like it or not, the U.S. Government “owns” an interest in Berkshire’s earnings of a size determined by Congress. In effect, our country’s Treasury Department holds a special class of our stock – call this holding the AA shares – that receives large “dividends” (that is, tax payments) from Berkshire. In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well with its AA shares. Indeed, the Treasury’s “stock,” which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to the federal government.

从经济现实开始：无论喜欢与否，美国政府“拥有”对伯克希尔的一部分股权，而这规模由国会决定。 实际上，我们国家的财政部持有我们的特殊种类股票“AA股”，从伯克希尔获得大量“股息”（即纳税）。 在2017年，与多年前一样，企业税率为35％，这意味着财政部从它的AA股中收获颇丰。

Last year, however, 40% of the government’s “ownership” (14/35ths) was returned to Berkshire – free of charge – when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%. Consequently, our “A” and “B” shareholders received a major boost in the earnings attributable to their shares

然而去年，当企业所得税降低至21%，相当于政府所拥有的这部分“股权”的40%无偿归还给了伯克希尔。 因此，我们的A股和B股股东获得了大幅收益 。

This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of the Berkshire shares you and I own. The same dynamic, moreover, enhanced the intrinsic value of almost all of the stocks Berkshire holds.

这实质上增加了伯克希尔股票的内在价值，同时也增加了几乎所有伯克希尔拥有股票的内在价值。

Those are the headlines. But there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain. For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility operation get passed along to its customers. Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little changed at about 13%. (This lower rate has long been logical because our investees have already paid tax on the earnings that they pay to us.) Overall, however, the new law made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more valuable.

这些是最重要的，还有其他一些因素可以削弱了我们的收益。 例如，我们运营的大型公用设施将税收优惠传导给了消费者。同时，大额分红税率税率几乎没有变化，约为13％。 （这个较低的税率长期以来是合乎逻辑的，因为我们投资的公司已经为给我们的分红缴纳过一遍税款。）但总的来说，新的税法使我们的企业和我们拥有的股票更有价值。

Which suggests that we return to the performance of our non-insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in this grove are BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90.9% owned). Combined, they earned $9.3 billion before tax last year, up 6% from 2017. You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-45.

我们非保险业务中最突出的当属BNSF和Berkshire Hathaway Energy（拥有90.9％股权）。 他们去年税前收入为93亿美元，比2017年增长了6％。

Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate pre-tax income in 2018 of $6.4 billion, up from the $5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017.

接下来收入排名前五的非保险子公司（以下按字母顺序排列）为：Clayton Homes，International Metalworking，Lubrizol，Marmon和Precision Castparts，2018年的税前收入合计64亿美元，2017年这一数字是55亿美元。

The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.4 billion pre-tax last year, up from $2.1 billion in 2017.

接下来的五个：Forest River，Johns Manville，MiTek，Shaw和TTI 去年税前收入为24亿美元，高于2017年的21亿美元。

The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had pre-tax income of $3.6 billion in 2018 vs. $3.3 billion in 2017.

其余非保险业务2018年税前收入为为36亿美元，2017年为33亿美元。

保险，“浮存金”和伯克希尔的资金

Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business – our fifth grove – has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.

我们的财产/人寿（“P / C”）保险业务 - 我们的第五个树林 - 自1967年以来一直是推动伯克希尔增长的引擎，那一年我们以860万美元收购国民保险公司及其姊妹公司National Fire＆Marine。 时至今日，国民保险是世界上净值最大的P / C公司。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.

我们被P / C业务吸引的一个原因是该行业的商业模式：P / C保险公司先收到保费、后支付赔偿。在极端情况下，例如因接触石棉而引起的索赔，或严重的工伤事故，付款可以持续数十年。

This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

这种“先收后付”的商业模式使得保险公司持有大量资金——这些资金我们称为“浮存金”。 与此同时，保险公司可以将这笔资金用于投资而获得收益。尽管保单和索赔此消彼长，但浮存金的规模通常保持稳定。 因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也在增长。 下表展示了我们浮存金规模的增长：

包括因人寿，年金和健康保险业务而产生的浮存金。

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or nearterm demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.

我们的浮存金有可能会出现短期下降。但下降将是 非常缓慢的 - 一年不会超过3％。 保险合约的本质是，确保我们不会在短期内支付巨额资金，以避免威胁到我们的现金流。这一结构需要经过精心设计，是保险公司保有财务实力的关键。

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

如果我们的保费超过我们需要支付的费用和赔偿，我们的保险业务就会产生一笔承保利润。 当获得这样的利润时，我们就可以享受使用免费资金 - 而且，更好的是，通过持有它获得收益 。

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. That loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.

不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望获得这一结果，因而产生了激烈的竞争。有时会导致整个P / C行业遭受巨大的承保损失。保险公司不得不为保有浮存金而付出代价。尽管其所有公司都享有浮存金收益，但仍激烈的竞争使得美国的保险业相比其他行业，拥有惨淡的净资产收益率。

Nevertheless, I like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing our float than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage and occasionally offer major opportunities. When other insurers are constrained, our choices expand.

不过，我对我们自己的前景充满信心。 伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使我们在投资浮存金方面比其他保险公司拥有更大的灵活性。

Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 15 of the past 16 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was $3.2 billion. For the entire 16-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled $27 billion, of which $2 billion was recorded in 2018.

此外，我们的P / C公司有很好的承保记录。 伯克希尔的保险业务在过去16年中有15年拥有承保利润，例外是2017年，当时我们的税前亏损为32亿美元。 整个16年的时间里，我们的税前收益总计270亿美元，其中20亿美元是在2018年录得的。

That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the benefits of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

这一记录并非偶然：风险评估是我们保险经理的日常关注点，他们知道一旦发生糟糕的承保结果，浮存金所能带来的好处将荡然无存。 所有保险公司都会口头传达这一点。但在伯克希尔，这是一种宗教，宛如旧约。

**********

In most cases, the funding of a business comes from two sources – debt and equity. At Berkshire, we have two additional arrows in the quiver to talk about, but let’s first address the conventional components.

在大多数情况下，企业的资金来自两个来源 - 债务和股权。 在伯克希尔，我们还有另外两种来源，但让我们先讲一讲传统的这两个来源。

We use debt sparingly. Many managers, it should be noted, will disagree with this policy, arguing that significant debt juices the returns for equity owners. And these more venturesome CEOs will be right most of the time.

我们谨慎使用债务。 应该指出，许多管理人员不同意这一政策，并认为举债能增加股东回报。而这些更冒险的CEO们大多数时候都是正确的。

At rare and unpredictable intervals, however, credit vanishes and debt becomes financially fatal. A Russianroulette equation – usually win, occasionally die – may make financial sense for someone who gets a piece of a company’s upside but does not share in its downside. But that strategy would be madness for Berkshire. Rational people don’t risk what they have and need for what they don’t have and don’t need.

然而，在罕见和不可预测的时点，债务将变得致命。俄式轮盘赌公式 - 通常是胜利，偶尔会死 - 对那些只分享公司上升期的人来说可能有些金融价值的参考，但这种策略对伯克希尔来说是疯狂的。 理智的人不会在他已拥有的东西上冒风险，也不会在他不拥有或不需要的东西上过分贪婪。

Most of the debt you see on our consolidated balance sheet – see page K-65 – resides at our railroad and energy subsidiaries, both of them asset-heavy companies. During recessions, the cash generation of these businesses remains bountiful. The debt they use is both appropriate for their operations and not guaranteed by Berkshire.

您在我们的合并资产负债表上看到的大部分债务 - 见第K-65页 - 都来自我们的铁路和能源子公司，均为资产密集型公司。 在经济衰退期间，这些企业的现金流充裕。 他们背负的债务规模与实际业务相匹配，同时伯克希尔也无需为这些债务担保。

Our level of equity capital is a different story: Berkshire’s $349 billion is unmatched in corporate America. By retaining all earnings for a very long time, and allowing compound interest to work its magic, we have amassed funds that have enabled us to purchase and develop the valuable groves earlier described. Had we instead followed a 100% payout policy, we would still be working with the $22 million with which we began fiscal 1965.

我们的股权资本水平则是另一回事：伯克希尔的3490亿美元在美国企业中是无与伦比的。 通过长期保有盈利，并利用复利发挥其魔力，我们积累了能够支持我们发展上述四个小树林的资金。 如果我们改为100％分红，我们目前资金可能跟1965年差不多，大约为2200万美元 。

Beyond using debt and equity, Berkshire has benefitted in a major way from two less-common sources of corporate funding. The larger is the float I have described. So far, those funds, though they are recorded as a huge net liability on our balance sheet, have been of more utility to us than an equivalent amount of equity. That’s because they have usually been accompanied by underwriting earnings. In effect, we have been paid in most years for holding andusing other people’s money

除了使用债务和股权之外，伯克希尔还有两个不那么常见的资金来源。其中更大的一个是我在上文提到的浮存金。 到目前为止，这些资金虽然在资产负债表上被记录为大额净负债，但这些资金比同等规模的股权对我们来说更有用。那是因为他们通常会有承保利润。 实际上，我们多数时候因为持有或使用这部分浮存金而获得报酬。

As I have often done before, I will emphasize that this happy outcome is far from a sure thing: Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years to surface. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as a hurricane or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a megacatastrophe strikes, we will get our share of the losses and they will be big – very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, we will be looking to add business the next day.

但是这个看上去很完美的结果，其实拥有很高的不确定性：错误评估保险风险带来的后果可能是巨大的，并可能需要花费多年去填坑。 （想想历史上的石棉赔案）“一场巨大风险事件”可能来自传统的场景，例如飓风或地震，也有可能是完全出乎意外的，比如，网络攻击带来的灾难性后果，而这些已超出了保险公司现在所考虑的范畴。 当这样超级巨型灾难降临的时候，我们的投资将会遭受损失，他们将是巨大的 - 非常巨大。

The final funding source – which again Berkshire possesses to an unusual degree – is deferred income taxes. These are liabilities that we will eventually pay but that are meanwhile interest-free.

第四种资金来源就是是递延所得税。这些是我们最终会支付的负债，但同时也是无息的。

As I indicated earlier, about $14.7 billion of our $50.5 billion of deferred taxes arises from the unrealized gains in our equity holdings. These liabilities are accrued in our financial statements at the current 21% corporate tax rate but will be paid at the rates prevailing when our investments are sold. Between now and then, we in effect have an interest-free “loan” that allows us to have more money working for us in equities than would otherwise be the case.

正如我早些时候指出的那样，我们505亿美元递延税款中约有147亿美元来自我们尚未确认的股权投资收入。 这些负债在我们的财务报表中目前按21%税率计算，但如果我们出售股权将按实际的税率支付。 这意味着在实际支付税款之前，我们实际上拥有一种免息的“贷款”。

A further $28.3 billion of deferred tax results from our being able to accelerate the depreciation of assets such as plant and equipment in calculating the tax we must currently pay. The front-ended savings in taxes that we record gradually reverse in future years. We regularly purchase additional assets, however. As long as the present tax law prevails, this source of funding should trend upward.

另外还有283亿美元的递延税，这是因为我们加速现有一些资产的折旧，比如工厂和设备。但是，我们仍然会定期购买其他资产。只要现行税法仍然施行，这种资金来源就让然会呈上升趋势。

Over time, Berkshire’s funding base – that’s the right-hand side of our balance sheet – should grow, primarily through the earnings we retain. Our job is to put the money retained to good use on the left-hand side, by adding attractive assets.

随着时间的推移，伯克希尔的资金基础主要将通过我们保有利润而或得增长。我们的工作是通过购买更有吸引力的资产，使得资金获得更高效的运用。

GEICO和Tony Nicely

That title says it all: The company and the man are inseparable.

这个标题说明了一切：公司和这个男人是不可分割的。

Tony joined GEICO in 1961 at the age of 18; I met him in the mid-1970s. At that time, GEICO, after a fourdecade record of both rapid growth and outstanding underwriting results, suddenly found itself near bankruptcy. A recently-installed management had grossly underestimated GEICO’s loss costs and consequently underpriced its product. It would take many months until those loss-generating policies on GEICO’s books – there were no less than 2.3 million of them – would expire and could then be repriced. The company’s net worth in the meantime was rapidly approaching zero.

Tony于1961年加入GEICO，时年18岁; 我在20世纪70年代中期遇见了他。那个时候，GEICO在经过40年快速增长和出色的承保业绩之后，突然接近破产。 新上任的管理层严重低估了GEICO所需支付的代价，因此低估了产品价格。 产生赔偿的保单金额达到230万美元，但直到数月后这些保单才过期，从而可以重新定价。那个时候公司的净资产很快接近零。

In 1976, Jack Byrne was brought in as CEO to rescue GEICO. Soon after his arrival, I met him, concluded that he was the perfect man for the job, and began to aggressively buy GEICO shares. Within a few months, Berkshire bought about 13 of the company, a portion that later grew to roughly 12 without our spending a dime. That stunning accretion occurred because GEICO, after recovering its health, consistently repurchased its shares. All told, this halfinterest in GEICO cost Berkshire $47 million, about what you might pay today for a trophy apartment in New York.

1976年，Jack Byrne被任命担任GEICO的首席执行官。他上任后不久，我遇见了他，认为他是这份工作的最佳人选，并开始积极购买GEICO股票。几个月内，伯克希尔购买了公司约 1 / 3的股份，后来虽然没有花一毛钱，但这部分股份比例增长到约1 / 2。因为GEICO在恢复元气后不断回购其股票。总而言之，这部分股权花费了伯克希尔4700万美元，相当于今天你在纽约买一套豪华公寓的价格。

Let’s now fast-forward 17 years to 1993, when Tony Nicely was promoted to CEO. At that point, GEICO’s reputation and profitability had been restored – but not its growth. Indeed, at yearend 1992 the company had only 1.9 million auto policies on its books, far less than its pre-crisis high. In sales volume among U.S. auto insurers, GEICO then ranked an undistinguished seventh.

现在让我们快进17年到1993年，Tony Nicely晋升为首席执行官。那时，GEICO的声誉和盈利能力已经恢复 - 但它的增长仍然没有。事实上，在1992年年底，公司账面上只有190万汽车保单，远低于危机前的高点。在美国汽车保险公司中，按销量排名，GEICO排名区区第七。

Late in 1995, after Tony had re-energized GEICO, Berkshire made an offer to buy the remaining 50% of the company for $2.3 billion, about 50 times what we had paid for the first half (and people say I never pay up!). Our offer was successful and brought Berkshire a wonderful, but underdeveloped, company and an equally wonderful CEO, who would move GEICO forward beyond my dreams.

1995年晚些时候，在Tony重振GEICO之后，伯克希尔提出以23亿美元收购剩余股权，约为我们上一次收购GEICO股权价格的50倍。 我们的收购成功了，使得伯克希尔收获了一个很棒的、但是当时并没有发展得很好的公司，同时也收获了一个极为出色的CEO。在他的带领下，GEICO正在超越我的期待。

GEICO is now America’s Number Two auto insurer, with sales 1,200% greater than it recorded in 1995. Underwriting profits have totaled $15.5 billion (pre-tax) since our purchase, and float available for investment has grown from $2.5 billion to $22.1 billion.

GEICO现在是美国第二大汽车保险公司，销售额比1995年增加了12倍。自我们购买以来，承保利润总额为155亿美元（税前），可用于投资的浮存金从25亿美元增长到221亿美元。

By my estimate, Tony’s management of GEICO has increased Berkshire’s intrinsic value by more than $50 billion. On top of that, he is a model for everything a manager should be, helping his 40,000 associates to identify and polish abilities they didn’t realize they possessed.

根据我的估计，Tony对GEICO的管理使伯克希尔的内在价值增加了500多亿美元。 最重要的是，他是所有管理者的标杆，帮助他的40,000名员工发挥潜能。

Last year, Tony decided to retire as CEO, and on June 30th he turned that position over to Bill Roberts, his long-time partner. I’ve known and watched Bill operate for several decades, and once again Tony made the right move. Tony remains Chairman and will be helpful to GEICO for the rest of his life. He’s incapable of doing less.

去年，托尼决定退休，并于6月30 日将这一职位转交给了Bill Roberts，他的长期合作伙伴。Tony再次做出了正确的决定。 Tony仍然是主席，并将在他的余生中帮助GEICO。

All Berkshire shareholders owe Tony their thanks. I head the list.

所有伯克希尔股东都欠Tony一声感谢。我首当其冲。

投资

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.8 billion, an amount reduced by our share of the large write-off of intangible assets taken by Kraft Heinz in 2018. At yearend, our Kraft Heinz holding had a market value of $14 billion and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.

下面列出了截至2018年底按照市场价格计算的前15大持仓。虽然卡夫亨氏理论上是伯克希尔的第六大重仓股、持有3.25亿股，但伯克希尔作为控制层的一员，需要将这部分投资计入“股权”项目。资产负债表中，伯克希尔持有卡夫亨氏的权益为138亿美元（GAAP下），已扣除2018年的无形资产减记。截至年底，我们持有卡夫亨氏市值为140亿美元，成本法估算（实际购买的价格+税基）为98亿美元。

*

不包括伯克希尔子公司养老基金持有的股份。

**

这是我们的实际购买价格以及我们的税基。

Charlie and I do not view the $172.8 billion detailed above as a collection of ticker symbols – a financial dalliance to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street,” expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour.

查理和我 不认为上面详述的1728亿美元只是一个股票代码的集合。这些代码通常因为华尔街评级下降、预期的美联储行动、可能的政治走向、经济学家预测等等，发生波动。

What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning about 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.

相反，在我们眼中，这是一群公司的集合——这些我们持有部分股份的公司，净资产收益率大约20%，并且经营稳健，不过度举债以获得利润。

Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared against the return that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 3% or less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.

在任何情况下，这些大型的、成熟的、业务也易于理解的公司所提供的回报都是非常可观的。 过去十年，与那些债券收益相比——3%，如果你投资了30年期美国国债的话可能更少，这些公司提供的回报已经足够令人兴奋了。

On occasion, a ridiculously-high purchase price for a given stock will cause a splendid business to become a poor investment – if not permanently, at least for a painfully long period. Over time, however, investment performance converges with business performance. And, as I will next spell out, the record of American business has been extraordinary.

有时，过高的买入股票，将使一个本来不错的业务变成一个很糟糕的生意，即便不是永久地，但至少在很长一段时间内会非常痛苦。但是更长久来看，投资业绩通常与经营业绩同步。而且，正如我接下来将说明的那样，美国企业的记录一直如此非凡。

"美国顺风"

On March 11th, it will be 77 years since I first invested in an American business. The year was 1942, I was 11, and I went all in, investing $114.75 I had begun accumulating at age six. What I bought was three shares of Cities Service preferred stock. I had become a capitalist, and it felt good.

77年前的3月11日，我第一次投资美国企业。这一年是1942年，我11岁，我将自6岁以来积累的所有资金114.75美金全部投入其中。我买了三股Cities Service优先股。我变成了资本家，这让我感觉良好。

Let’s now travel back through the two 77-year periods that preceded my purchase. That leaves us starting in 1788, a year prior to George Washington’s installation as our first president. Could anyone then have imagined what their new country would accomplish in only three 77-year lifetimes?

现在让我们回顾一下在此前的154年（2个77年）。那是1788年，乔治华盛顿就任我们首位总统的前一年。当时可以想象未来的231年（3个77年）间这个新的国家会取得什么成就吗？

During the two 77-year periods prior to 1942, the United States had grown from four million people – about 12 of 1% of the world’s population – into the most powerful country on earth. In that spring of 1942, though, it faced a crisis: The U.S. and its allies were suffering heavy losses in a war that we had entered only three months earlier. Bad news arrived daily

在1942年之前的154年间，美国从400万人（大约世界人口的0.5%）发展成世界上最强大的国家。然而，在1942年春天，它面临着一个危机危机：美国及其盟国在我们三个月前刚刚进入的战争中遭受重创。坏消息每天都有。

Despite the alarming headlines, almost all Americans believed on that March 11th that the war would be won. Nor was their optimism limited to that victory. Leaving aside congenital pessimists, Americans believed that their children and generations beyond would live far better lives than they themselves had led.

尽管有令人震惊的头条新闻，但那一年的3月11日，几乎所有美国人都相信他们将赢得这场战争。美国人相信他们的孩子和后代将有更好的生活。

The nation’s citizens understood, of course, that the road ahead would not be a smooth ride. It never had been. Early in its history our country was tested by a Civil War that killed 4% of all American males and led President Lincoln to openly ponder whether “a nation so conceived and so dedicated could long endure.” In the 1930s, America suffered through the Great Depression, a punishing period of massive unemployment.

当然美国人民也清楚前方的道路从来不会一帆风顺。 更早时候，我们的国家受到内战的考验，这场战争扼杀了4%美国男性人口。以至于总统林肯公开发问这个国家能否长期存在。在20世纪30年代，美国又经历了大萧条。

Nevertheless, in 1942, when I made my purchase, the nation expected post-war growth, a belief that proved to be well-founded. In fact, the nation’s achievements can best be described as breathtaking.

然而，在1942年当我购买股票时，这个国家已经在预期战后的增长，后来也得到了验证。

Let’s put numbers to that claim: If my $114.75 had been invested in a no-fee S&P 500 index fund, and all dividends had been reinvested, my stake would have grown to be worth (pre-taxes) $606,811 on January 31, 2019 (the latest data available before the printing of this letter). That is a gain of 5,288 for 1. Meanwhile, a $1 million investment by a tax-free institution of that time – say, a pension fund or college endowment – would have grown to about $5.3 billion.

让我们为这个说法提供数字：如果我的114.75美元投资于标准普尔500指数基金，所有股息再投资，我的这部分持仓将在2019年1月31日达到税前价值606,811美元，也就是5288倍的增长。如果当时的免税机构- 例如养老基金或大学捐赠 -投资100万美元，那么现在将价值53亿美元。

Let me add one additional calculation that I believe will shock you: If that hypothetical institution had paid only 1% of assets annually to various “helpers,” such as investment managers and consultants, its gain would have been cut in half, to $2.65 billion. That’s what happens over 77 years when the 11.8% annual return actually achieved by the S&P 500 is recalculated at a 10.8% rate.

还有一个令人震惊的计算：如果上述机构每年拿出资产的1%支付给投资经理或顾问，那么他的收益将会削减一半，至26.5亿美元。

Those who regularly preach doom because of government budget deficits (as I regularly did myself for many years) might note that our country’s national debt has increased roughly 400-fold during the last of my 77-year periods. That’s 40,000%! Suppose you had foreseen this increase and panicked at the prospect of runaway deficits and a worthless currency. To “protect” yourself, you might have eschewed stocks and opted instead to buy 314 ounces of gold with your $114.75.

有一些人他们通常会宣称美国即将遭受厄运，原因是政府有高额的财政赤字。在过去的几年中，美国国债增加了大约400倍。假设你已经预见到这种增长，并对失控的赤字和贬值的货币赶到恐慌。为了“保护”自己，你可能会避开股票，转而用114.75美金买了3 1 / 4盎司黄金。

And what would that supposed protection have delivered? You would now have an asset worth about $4,200, less than 1% of what would have been realized from a simple unmanaged investment in American business. The magical metal was no match for the American mettle.

这个“保护”会带来什么？你现在的资产价值4200美金，不到持有标普500指数所获得资产收益的1%。

Our country’s almost unbelievable prosperity has been gained in a bipartisan manner. Since 1942, we have had seven Republican presidents and seven Democrats. In the years they served, the country contended at various times with a long period of viral inflation, a 21% prime rate, several controversial and costly wars, the resignation of a president, a pervasive collapse in home values, a paralyzing financial panic and a host of other problems. All engendered scary headlines; all are now history

美国以两党的方式获得了几乎令人难以置信的繁荣。自1942年以来，我们有七位共和党总统和七位民主党总统。在他们担任总统的这些年里，美国经历了很长时间严重的通货膨胀、几次有争议且代价高昂的战争、房价崩盘、金融恐慌和其他一系列问题。 而这些都已成为历史。

Christopher Wren, architect of St. Paul’s Cathedral, lies buried within that London church. Near his tomb are posted these words of description (translated from Latin): “If you would seek my monument, look round you.” Those skeptical of America’s economic playbook should heed his message.

圣保罗大教堂的建筑师克里斯托弗雷恩（Christopher Wren）被埋葬在伦敦教堂内。他的墓志铭（翻译自拉丁语）：“如果你想寻找我的纪念碑，环顾四周。”

In 1788 – to go back to our starting point – there really wasn’t much here except for a small band of ambitious people and an embryonic governing framework aimed at turning their dreams into reality. Today, the Federal Reserve estimates our household wealth at $108 trillion, an amount almost impossible to comprehend.

在1788年 - 回到我们的出发点 - 当时除了一小群野心勃勃的人，计划着用萌芽期的政府治理框架来实现他们的梦想，美国还几乎一无所有。今天，美联储估算，美国的家庭财富已达到 108万亿美元。

Remember, earlier in this letter, how I described retained earnings as having been the key to Berkshire’s prosperity? So it has been with America. In the nation’s accounting, the comparable item is labeled “savings.” And save we have. If our forefathers had instead consumed all they produced, there would have been no investment, no productivity gains and no leap in living standards.

请记住，在这封信的前面，我是如何提到，伯克希尔繁荣的关键，在于保有盈利、享受复利？对国家来说，也是一样，关键在于“储蓄”。如果我们的前辈只消耗、不投资，我们将无法获得生产力的提升和生活水平的提高。

**********

Charlie and I happily acknowledge that much of Berkshire’s success has simply been a product of what I think should be called The American Tailwind. It is beyond arrogance for American businesses or individuals to boast that they have “done it alone.” The tidy rows of simple white crosses at Normandy should shame those who make such claims.

查理和我高兴地承认伯克希尔的大部分成功必须归功于我们称之为的这场“美国顺风”。

There are also many other countries around the world that have bright futures. About that, we should rejoice: Americans will be both more prosperous and safer if all nations thrive. At Berkshire, we hope to invest significant sums across borders.

世界上仍然有很多国家拥有光明的未来。关于这一点，我们应该赶到高兴：如果所有国家都和繁荣，美国人民将更加安全、也将更加兴旺。伯克希尔希望可以大笔投资海外企业。

Over the next 77 years, however, the major source of our gains will almost certainly be provided by The American Tailwind. We are lucky – gloriously lucky – to have that force at our back.

当然在接下来的77年里，我们收获的主要来源几乎肯定源于“美国顺风”。我们很幸运，在我们的背后拥有这股力量。

年会

Berkshire’s 2019 annual meeting will take place on Saturday, May 4th. If you are thinking about attending – and Charlie and I hope you come – check out the details on pages A-2 – A-3. They describe the same schedule we’ve followed for some years.

伯克希尔2019年年会将于5月4 日星期六举行。日程与前几年相似，我们欢迎你的到来。

If you can’t join us in Omaha, attend via Yahoo’s webcast. Andy Serwer and his Yahoo associates do an outstanding job, both in covering the entire meeting and interviewing many Berkshire managers, celebrities, financial experts and shareholders from the U.S. and abroad. The world’s knowledge of what goes on in Omaha the first Saturday of every May has grown dramatically since Yahoo came on board. Its coverage begins at 8:45 a.m. CDT and provides Mandarin translation.

如果您不能前来现场，可以通过雅虎的网络直播参加。Andy Serwer和他的雅虎员工做了一个出色的工作，报道整个年会，并采访了许多伯克希尔的经理人，名人，以及来自美国和海外的金融专家和股东。自雅虎上线报道以来，伯克希尔年会的影响力急剧增长。今年报道将于上午8:45 CDT开始，并提供普通话翻译。

**********

For 54 years, Charlie and I have loved our jobs. Daily, we do what we find interesting, working with people we like and trust. And now our new management structure has made our lives even more enjoyable.

54年来，我和查理都热爱我们的工作。每天，我们做我们认为有趣的事情，与我们喜欢并信任的人合作。现在，新的公司管理结构使我们的生活更加愉快。

With the whole ensemble – that is, with Ajit and Greg running operations, a great collection of businesses, a Niagara of cash-generation, a cadre of talented managers and a rock-solid culture – your company is in good shape for whatever the future brings.

整个团队，在Ajit和Greg的带领下，运作了非常多的公司，产生巨大的现金流，拥有极富才华的管理人员和坚不可摧的文化。无论未来如何，你所拥有的公司目前都拥有着很好的面貌。

2019年2月23日

沃伦·巴菲特

董事会主席